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RELIGION AND FAMILY LAW IN IRELAND: FROM A CATHOLIC 
PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE TO A “CATHOLIC” APPROACH TO NULLITY  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In works about comparative family law Ireland is often portrayed as having a very 
conservative approach to the family, particularly in its attitude to divorce.1 This 
approach has been attributed to the influence of the Irish Constitution of 1937 which 
heralded an age of highly restrictive family law, in contrast to more liberal trends in 
the rest of Europe at that time.2 Catholicism was an important part of the Irish 
national identity3  and the articles of the Irish constitution relevant to family matters 
are influenced by Catholic values.  
This chapter will examine the development of a separate treatment of Catholic 
marriages by the secular courts before the framing of the Irish constitution. It will go 
on to analyse the underlying Catholic influences behind the constitutional ban4 on 
divorce in Ireland. The use of Catholic doctrines by the courts will be examined.  It 
will be argued that far from being an entirely conservative influence, Catholic 
doctrines were used by some of the judiciary to create a functioning alternative to  
divorce. This „catholic‟ approach to Church doctrines shows that in family law the 
courts will find a way to reflect prevailing liberal morality even if they must use an 
inherently conservative framework.   
2. PRE 1937: TWO SEPERATE FUNCTIONING SYSTEMS 
Before the founding of the Irish Free State and the express legal recognition of 
Catholic values in the Irish constitution, the doctrines of the Church had a huge 
influence on the average Irish marriage. Although English rule had extended many 
English Marriage Acts to Ireland,5 most left Catholic marriages outside their scope.  
The regulation of Catholic marriages was left to the devices of the Catholic Church. 
The grant of a Church annulment allowed a Catholic to remarry within the Catholic 
Church according to Catholic formalities and there was little reason for Catholics to 
turn to the secular courts.   
The Marriages (Ireland) Act 1844 left most of the formalities of a Catholic marriage 
entirely up to the Catholic Church. This disinterest in the marital affairs of Roman 
Catholics tied in very well with the position taken by the Roman Catholic Church, 
                                                 
1  M ANTOKOLSKAIA, Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe: A Historical Perspective (European 
Family Law Series, Intersentia, Antwerp 2006).   
2  ibid 253. 
3  ibid 252. 
4  Found in the original Article 41.3.2° of the Irish Constitution. 
5  These included prohibitions on marriage within the prohibited degrees (32 Henry VIII c6); 
Prohibitions on a Catholic priest celebrating a mixed marriage or a Protestant marriage (6 Anne c16; 12 
Geo 1 c3; 19 Geo II c13: 23 Geo II c 10; 32 Geo III c21 ss 9 10; 33 Geo III c21 s12) and some legislation 
prohibiting clandestine marriage. 
that the regulation of marriage within the community of Roman Catholics was a 
matter in its exclusive competence.6  
Although judicial divorce was introduced to England and Wales in 1857 no such 
facility was given to the Irish courts. 7  The possibility of a parliamentary divorce8  
continued until 1922 but was rarely exercised.  
The Matrimonial Causes and Marriage Law (Ireland) Amendment Act 1870 
transferred matrimonial jurisdiction from the ecclesiastical courts to a new civil 
court.  This ultimately gave the Irish High court the right to grant decrees of nullity 
based on the same grounds as previously used by the English ecclesiastical courts.  
From 1870, the Irish secular courts had the power to grant nullity decrees but were 
not used by the vast majority of the Irish population. The civil courts were used far 
less than the Regional Matrimonial Tribunals of the Roman Catholic Church. 
Between 1901 and 1909 for example, there were only 36 decrees granted by the 
secular courts in total (including divorce a mensa et thoro, nullity and restitution of 
conjugal rights).9 Most reported cases before the 1940s involve the marriages of the 
Protestant gentry in Ireland.10 Without the benefit of establishment, the Roman 
Catholic Church became the focal point of marriage regulation for Roman Catholics.  
Just before the framing of the Irish Constitution, the mainly Protestant judiciary 
tread a careful line when dealing with the secular invalidity of Catholic marriages. 
They often backed up their decisions with contemporary Catholic canon law to give 
their decisions public legitimacy. The judges were deferential to the religious 
scruples of Catholic parties. As a result, where the technically applicable law was in 
opposition to the position of contemporary Catholic teaching or the rulings of the 
Matrimonial Tribunals of the Catholic Church a compromise to give effect to the 
Catholic teachings could usually be found.  
In  A v A (Sued as B)11 where a Roman Catholic couple already had a decree of nullity 
from the Catholic courts, the court developed a sort of estoppel doctrine to give 
validity to Catholic rulings. Where the marriage had been declared invalid by the 
Catholic Matrimonial courts and this was accepted by the respondent, the 
respondent could not raise objections to a decree of nullity in the secular courts.  
                                                 
6  Report of the Royal Commission   on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes  1868, appendix,  Letter 13 
from Archbishop Leahy suggests that any state regulation would be superfluous as the sanctity of 
marriage was held in high regard by all Irish Catholics;  W DUNCAN, 'Supporting the Institution of 
Marriage in Ireland' [1978] The Irish Jurist 215, 217.  
7  The 1857 Act implemented the recommendations of the First Report of the Commissioners 
appointed by Her Majesty to enquire into the law of divorce, and more particularly into the mode of 
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8  In the Report of the Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes [Cd.6478-9], 1912-13, 
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Irish Private Divorce Acts. 
9  Report of the Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes [Cd.6478-9], 1912-13, xviii, 143.  
10  W DUNCAN, 'Supporting the Institution of Marriage in Ireland' [1978] The Irish Jurist 215, 216. 
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Hanna J outlined the extent of the secular law applicable to Catholic marriages in 
McM v McM & McK v McK.12  Under the 1870 Matrimonial Causes and Marriage 
Law (Ireland) Amendment Act, the jurisdiction of the Irish High Court was the same 
as that enjoyed by the English ecclesiastical Courts.13 The Irish Courts thus applied 
English ecclesiastical Law which was made up of Catholic canon law as it existed in 
the reign of Henry VIII subject to amendments made by the Bishops and 
Archbishops of the Church of England and by English secular legislation.  
The creation of this myth, that medieval canon law formed part of the English 
ecclesiastical law,14 opened the door for the import of contemporary canon law 
principles into Irish law. If medieval canon law was part of the secular law, then 
contemporary canon law merely showed the development of medieval canon law 
principles and could be used as a persuasive source of authority. This fitted 
conveniently with the political dilemma faced by the judiciary of holding Catholic 
couples to rules that were not in harmony with the Catholic values held by the 
majority of the Irish people. 
Although  McM reached the secular courts, it is clear from the report that the parties 
involved gave first importance to the ruling of the Catholic Church courts. McM 
involved the nullity of a marriage entered into in 1927. The marriage had never been 
consummated and the parties were living apart after permission had been granted to 
them by the Archbishop of Tuam. The husband sought to have the marriage 
annulled on the basis of his own impotence. The wife refused to repudiate the 
marriage, for reasons of conscience until set aside by the Catholic Courts.  
Hanna J noted that unlike in England and Scotland there was a strong public policy 
in Ireland to preserve marriages and nullity should not be granted lightly. Otherwise 
the law would create a way for petitioners to circumvent the law and established 
public opinion and “make their marriage vows as false as dicers‟ oaths.”15  
He looked to a variety of sources to support his ruling that a petitioner could not 
rely on his or her own impotence including the 1917 Canon law, Judgments from the 
English and Scottish Matrimonial courts, the Codex Juris Ecclesiastici Anglicani, the 
Ecclesiastical Law of the Church of Ireland and Pothier‟s  Traité du Contrat de 
Mariage. Thankfully, all sources were consistent on the point giving his judgment 
both Catholic and secular legitimacy.  
The case does little to clarify the principles applicable to nullity in Irish law. 
However, Hanna J‟s reliance on contemporary canon law source shows an 
understanding by the court that Catholicism was the most legitimate source of law 
in the eyes of most Catholic couples. His judgment is diplomatic, supported by 
secular authorities and canon law. This mixing of authorities was to continue in Irish 
                                                 
12   McK v McK [1936] IR 177. 
13  McK v McK [1936] IR 177, 187.  
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distinguished and is now largely discredited.  
15  McK v McK [1936] IR 177, 185. 
nullity jurisprudence up until the late 1990s. However, the policy reasons for doing 
so were to change radically. 
3. THE IRISH CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE: A 
PROTECTION OF CATHOLIC VALUES?  
Irish law is currently subject to Bunreacht na h-Éireann, a constitution brought into 
force in 1937. Although the Constitution has been subject to many amendments since 
1937, the family related Article 41  retains most of its original wording.  
Many of the framers of the Irish constitution were devout Catholics with a good 
knowledge of canon law.16 From the beginning of the drafting process, marriage and 
the family were subject to express constitutional protection.  The original draft of the 
1937 Constitution showed a desire to define marriage and the ways in which a 
marriage could be dissolved at a constitutional level. To give a flavour of the initial 
approach to family and marriage the article is reproduced in full:   
1. The State guarantees the constitution and protection of the family as the 
basis of moral education and social discipline and harmony, and the sure 
foundation of ordered society. 
2. (1) The constitution of the family depends on valid marriage. 
(2) Marriage, as the basis of family life, is under the special protection of 
the State; attacks on the sanctity of marriage or of family life are 
prohibited. 
(3) Contraception and advocacy of the practice of contraception are 
prohibited and the possession, use, sale and distribution of contraceptives 
shall be punishable. 
(4) No law shall be enacted authorising the dissolution of a valid 
consummated marriage of baptised persons. No law shall be enacted 
authorising the annulment of marriage save on the following grounds, 
namely, that either or both of the parties did not agree to enter into the 
marriage contract, or was or were not free to enter, or did not freely enter 
into the marriage contract, or that the marriage was under the law for the 
time being in force invalid in form. Subject to the forgoing, the contract of 
marriage shall be regulated by law. 
(5) The State shall encourage early marriage and foster the production of 
large families by appropriate grants of remission of taxation in respect of 
children, by the promotion of saving and thrift schemes and by facilitating 
the provision of housing accommodation on reasonable terms.17 
 
                                                 
16  For example, John Hearne was part of the original committee set up to review the 1922 
constitution in 1934. He had trained for the priest hood before becoming a barrister. See further:  D 
KEOGH AND A MCCARTHY, The Making of the Irish Constitution 1937 (Mercier Press, Cork 2007). 
17  UCDA P150/2373 October draft; reproduced in D KEOGH AND A MCCARTHY, The Making of the 
Irish Constitution 1937 (Mercier Press, Cork 2007) 113. 
Under this Article the constitutional family was based, not only on marriage, but on 
a valid marriage and the grounds for nullity were spelt out. It is possible that under 
such a constitution the courts could have continued with all the previous common 
law grounds. The constitution technically only prohibited the enactment of law 
allowing nullity for other reasons, not the retention of the grounds in use. There is a 
strong prohibition on divorce that seems to apply only to Christians, being limited to 
„baptised persons.‟18  This coincides with idea of the sacramental nature of marriage 
between Catholics at the time.19  
Further Catholic influences on the framing of the articles protecting the family are 
abundant. McQuaid20 forwarded no less than two copies of the 1917 Codex Iuris 
Canonicis to the drafting team.  In September 1936, Cahill21 wrote to de Valera22 
arguing that the new Constitution must mark „a definite break with the Liberal and 
non-Christian type of State.‟ He went on to suggest that, „A Constitution for Ireland 
should be, if not confessedly Catholic (which may at present be not feasible) at least 
definitely and confessedly Christian.23‟ 
At De Valera‟s suggestion Cahill put his submissions into the form of draft articles 
and with the input of a committee of Jesuits.24  These draft articles suggested that Irish 
marriage law, as far as Catholics were concerned, should be given over to the 
competences of the Church and governed by canon law. In the alternative, they 
suggested that the nullity laws of Ireland should be identical to those of the Catholic 
Church.  
The final version of Article 41 (before amendment by the 1995 referendum) read as 
follows:  
1. 1° The State recognises the Family as the natural primary and 
fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution 
possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and 
superior to all positive law. 
                                                 
18  This would include anyone baptised „in the name of the Holy Trinity‟ in canon law.    
19  EN PETERS, The 1917 Pio-Benedictine Code of Canon Law (Ignatius, San Francisco 2001) 351, 
Canon 1012.  
20  John Charles McQuaid, Archbishop of Dublin (1940-1972). 
21  Fr Cahill was de Valera‟s main link with the Jesuit order. See further:  D KEOGH AND A 
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President of Ireland and Head of the Constitutional  Drafting Committee.  
23 UCDA P150/2393 Letter from Fr Cahill with suggestions for the drafting of the new constitution. 
September 4, 1936. 
24  The annotations ground this submission in paplical encyclicals: Leo XIII Quod Apostolici Muneris, On 
Socialism, 28 December 1878. Available online at 
<http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Leo13/l13apost.htm>  and Leo XIII Arcanum Divinici (On 
Marriage), February 10 1880. Available online at 
<http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Leo13/l13cmr.htm>. 
2° The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its 
constitution and authority and the necessary basis of social order and 
as indispensable to the welfare of the Nation and the State. 
 
2. 1° In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, 
woman gives to the State a support without which the common good 
cannot be achieved. 
2° The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall 
not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect 
of their duties in the home. 
 
3. 1° The State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of 
Marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to protect it against 
attack. 
2° No law shall be enacted providing for the grant of a dissolution of 
marriage. 
3° No person whose marriage has been dissolved under the civil law 
of any other State but is a subsisting valid marriage under the law for 
the time being in force within the jurisdiction of the Government and 
Parliament established by this Constitution shall be capable of 
contracting a valid marriage within that jurisdiction during the 
lifetime of the other party to the marriage so dissolved.  
 
Whether the institution of marriage envisaged by the framers was predominately 
Catholic or whether it was a more Christian notion is not possible to answer 
definitively.25 Providing for the minority Protestant population was  a concern for 
the framers.  It is clear that the understanding of marriage in the Constitution was 
not based on the common law in force at the time. The evidence available suggests 
that the Irish framers had direct recourse to the canon law and Papal encyclicals.26 
 By using the language of Casti Connubii, the Irish framers rooted the constitutional 
understanding of marriage in sacrament rather than a civil institution of marriage or 
the rather confused jurisprudence of the common law. This understanding of 
marriage as inviolable and sacramental was underlined by the blanket ban on 
                                                 
25  Although McQuaid had no doubts on this point:  
„Of course, once the State acknowledges God‟s right to public worship, it cannot be secular, even if be 
not Catholic…And when the State legislates according to natural law, of necessity, it legislates 
according to Catholicity, because the latter is the guardian of the natural law.‟ 
McQuaid to de Valera, undated,  UCDA P150/2395. 
26  For example Keogh suggests that the McQuaid article was heavily influenced by Leo XIII‟s 
Encyclical, Rerum Novarum (On Capital and Labor) May 15 1891. D KEOGH AND A MCCARTHY, The 
Making of the Irish Constitution 1937 (Mercier Press, Cork 2007)133. The encyclical is cited by McQuaid 
in UCDA P250/2408. In addition McQuaid refers to Casti Connubii  and Pius XI, Quadragesino Anno 
(On Reconstruction of the Social Order) May 15 1931, UCDA P150/2395. 
divorce. There was no real understanding of secular idea of marriage in law that 
transcended all religious communities.  
When introducing the draft of the present Constitution to the Dáil, de Valera 
mentioned both the religious and social objections to divorce and emphasised the 
latter: 
From the social point of view, without considering any other point of 
view, the obvious evil would be so great, and it has been proved to be so 
great in other countries, that I do not think that any person would have 
any difficulty… in making a choice in this matter.27 
 
The framers believed in the evils of divorce and felt that the Catholic majority took 
precedence over the concerns of the Protestant minority. It was not that the framers 
of the constitution saw themselves as enforcing the doctrine of the Catholic Church 
per se but they honestly believed that divorce was a great evil; a view that was 
bolstered by their Catholic beliefs.28  
Some commentators have attempted to minimise the influence of Catholic teachings 
on the drafting of Articles 41 and 42. Sheehy, for example argues that the influences 
of the canon law on Articles 41 and 42 were not due to „religious belief but rather … 
the law itself.‟29 He dismisses any suggestion that Article 41 amounts to the 
importation of Roman Catholicism into the Constitution as „singularly unfortunate 
and misleading‟.30 His argument is based on the latent content of medieval canon 
law that was part of the ecclesiastical laws of England and in turn inherited by the 
1937 framers as part of the secular law. Thus, he argues, they had no choice but to 
include a canon law influence at a constitutional level. 
However, as seen in  McM v McM the only canon law that could be supposed to 
have legal force in Ireland was that passed before the Henrician Reformation. Yet, 
the framers of the Constitution had greater recourse to the canon law than a mere 
glance at medieval canon law principles. Certain draft articles actually reproduced 
the canon law of 1917.31 This seems to contradict Sheehy‟s assertion that the only 
influence of canon law on Articles 41 and 42 was that mandated by the King‟s 
ecclesiastical law.  
Articles 41 and 42 were in fact, subject to three religious influences; the latent 
influence of medieval canon law that remained in the civil law, the direct influence 
of the 1917 Canon law Code and the Papal encyclicals to which there the framers 
made reference and the Catholic influences of the personal beliefs of the framers: a 
                                                 
27  Dáil Debates, vol 67 col 1886. 
28  W DUNCAN, 'Supporting the Institution of Marriage in Ireland' [1978] The Irish Jurist 215. 
29  G SHEEHY, 'The Right to Marry in the Irish Tradition of the Common Law' in J O'REILLY (ed) 
Human Rights and Constitutional Law: Essays in Honour of Brian Walsh (The Round Hall Press, Dublin 
1992) 21. 
30  ibid 13. 
31  For example the emphasis in the October draft to baptised persons and the references in the X 
draft to the „essential properties of unity and indissolubility‟. 
form of cultural Catholicism. This means that the ideology behind the constitutional 
protection of marriage is based on the religious and social importance of marriage 
rather than the legal recognition of the institution by the common law at that time.  
Although the 1937 Constitution did not create an Established Church the secular 
idea of marriage that was to apply to all communities was inherently linked to 
Catholic doctrines.  
4. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO CATHOLIC VALUES IN THE IMMEDIATE 
AFTERMATH OF THE 1937 CONSTITUTION 
The express terms of Article 41.3.2° seemed to preclude the creation of new grounds 
for nullity. However, it took many years for the full effect of the constitutional 
protection of marriage to take hold in nullity jurisprudence. There is was little case 
law until the 1970s due the continuing reliance by most of the population on the 
Catholic matrimonial tribunals. Duncan suggests that this stagnation of the civil law 
was probably not the product of a conscious policy of deference by the State to the 
Church resulted from the slowness of the legislators to recognise the social need to 
develop civil law remedies.32  Litigation in the secular courts was also expensive and 
legal aid for family matters was not introduced until 1979.  
In the absence of legislation, conflicts between Church law and State law continued 
to occur in family cases. In general, most conflicts were resolved in favour of 
Catholic teachings and where the secular law differed to the canon law the judiciary 
tried to bring the two regimes into compliance.   
In Griffith v Griffith33 Haugh J brought the secular law and canon law together. This 
case concerned a nullity petition on the basis of duress. The husband petitioned for 
nullity as he had only married to prevent criminal conviction when his fiancée was 
found to be pregnant. The child turned out not to be his. Haugh J based his ruling on 
the law as outlined in McK vMcK and cited several authorities from the English 
ecclesiastical courts. He ruled that consent in this case was not real and that no 
marriage had been entered into. However, he also made reference to canon 1087 of 
the 1917 Code of Canon law34 and was influenced by the fact that the parties had 
secured a Church annulment.  Haugh J noted that canon 1087 applied to the facts 
and was similar to the test in the common law and held that in order for duress to 
erode the consent to marriage it had to come from a grave, external fear that is 
unjust.   
The report reflects Haugh‟s delight in bringing the parties into a legal situation that 
reflected canon law, „...I am glad that I can justly relieve the petitioner from the 
anomalous and unhappy position of being unmarried in the eyes of his Church and 
married according to the law of the land‟ 
                                                 
32  W DUNCAN, 'Supporting the Institution of Marriage in Ireland' [1978] The Irish Jurist 215, 227. 
33  Griffith v Griffith [1944] IR 35. 
34   ibid 52.  
Similarly, in Tilson v Tilson,35  a child care dispute, the court gave effect the Ne Temere 
decree by allowing the agreement that children be raised as Catholics to be enforced. 
In this case the husband and wife were married in a Roman Catholic Church. The 
husband signed an undertaking that any issue of the marriage would be brought up 
as Roman Catholics. When difference arose between the husband and wife the three 
elder children were removed by the husband and placed in a Protestant institution.  
In the High Court, Gavan Duffy P ordered that the children be returned to their 
mother on welfare grounds. However, his judgment was also motivated by Catholic 
values:  
In my opinion, an order of the court designed to secure the fulfilment of 
an agreement peremptorily required before a mixed marriage by the 
Church, whose special position in Ireland is officially recognised as the 
guardian of the faith of the Catholic spouse, cannot be withheld on any 
ground of public policy by the very State which pays homage to that 
Church. 
 
Both  Griffith  and  Tilson  show that while courts were not in the habit of directly 
applying canon law, some judges did refer to it as an influencing factor and were 
delighted when the common law could be develop in a manner consistent with 
Catholic teachings. 
Public confusion existed as to the laws applicable to marriage. In general, the public 
were much more familiar with Catholic teachings than the state of the common law.  
This created a two way problem between the Church and the courts in the area of 
bigamy cases. The grounds under which nullity could be granted by courts were 
narrower than those in contemporary Catholic teachings. Thus the courts were 
sometimes forced to declare valid, a marriage that was declared void by the Church 
courts. On the other hand, the Church was prepared to sanction re-marriage in the 
Church of a party to such a marriage in defiance of civil law.  
This situation forced O Briain J in The People v Ballins,36 to convict the defendant of 
bigamy even though in canon law he had committed no crime. He made a plea that 
the law be changed to comply with the canon law: 
 …after forty years of independence, it should be possible to amend the 
law here which for historical reasons now raises a grave problem of 
conscience for the majority of Irish citizens. 
 
The Catholic nature of the State continued to be stressed by the judiciary. In Ryan v 
Attorney General37 Kenny J expressly based the right to marry on the 'Christian and 
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democratic nature of the State' and backed up his argument by reading from papal 
encyclicals.  
This view that, where possible, the common law should be developed to reflect 
Catholic values was not limited to the judiciary. At the end of the 1960s Walsh 
argued that Irish civil law still preserved the old canon law bequeathed to it through 
the common law.38 In his thesis he argued that where possible the two laws should 
be made compatible and even called for the recognition of the exclusive matrimonial 
jurisdiction of the Catholic Church over Catholic marriages.39 The idea that marriage 
law should reflect different religious values for different religious groups was also 
reflected in proposals for constitutional reform. 
 
5. CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 1967: A CATHOLIC MARRIAGE LAW FOR 
CATHOLIC PEOPLE?   
The only comprehensive review of Article 41 before the introduction of divorce in 
1995 was the Report of the Committee on the Constitution, December 1967.40 The 
main criticism of Article 41.3.2° at that time was that it took no heed of the wishes of 
the Protestant minority of the population, who would wish to have divorce facilities 
and were not prevented by the tenets of their religious denomination. As the 
Constitution was originally intended for the whole of Ireland41 the prohibition was a 
source of embarrassment to those seeking to bring about better relations with the 
North. It was also argued that other predominately Catholic countries did not 
expressly ban the dissolution of marriage in their constitutions and that there was a 
more liberal attitude prevailing in Catholic circles since the Second Vatican Council. 
 The 1967 Committee on the Constitution suggested that a different wording of the 
Article 41.3.2,° would be appropriate so as not to cause offence to the religious 
minorities:  
In the case of a person who was married in accordance with the rites of a 
religion, no law shall be enacted providing for the grant of a dissolution of 
that marriage on grounds other that those acceptable to that religion.42 
 
This amendment would mean that the applicable marriage law would be different 
for each religion. No enthusiasm for the idea of a single notion of civil marriage 
applicable to all can be seen. The Committee acknowledged that the proposed 
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PR 9817, Dublin 1967). 
amendment might breach the constitutional prohibition on religious discrimination  
but suggested that a clause be introduced to make this article a special exception. 
The proposal demonstrates that divorce is no longer seen primarily as a factual 
social evil. Instead, the focus is on not offending the religious beliefs of citizens by 
offering them a legal option that is contrary to their faith.  
The Committee pointed out that Article 41 denied Catholics the rights of dissolution 
of marriage in situations allowed by the Vatican. The canon law had moved on since 
1937,43 but the nullity law of Ireland based on pre-Reformation canon law had not. 
Many thousands of such cases were dealt with by diocesan and metropolitan courts 
every year. The absolute prohibition in the Constitution had the effect of imposing 
more rigid regulations on Catholics than those required by the law of the Church. 
The Committee declared that the original Article was unnecessarily harsh and rigid 
and they unanimously declared that it should be changed and some form of divorce 
introduced.  
The proposal of different marriage laws for different religion opened up the 
possibility that people would convert to Protestantism to obtain a divorce.  The 
Committee thus outlined a need for laws to prevent people changing to another 
religion to avail of more liberal divorce laws.  
The proposals of the 1967 Committee were never implemented. Nullity law 
continued to develop subject to the original wording of Article 41.3.2° until the 
introduction of divorce in 1995. However, the proposals of the 1967 Committee do 
provide a snap shot into policy concerns at the time and the desire for nullity law to 
reflect Catholic values, at least for Catholic people.   
6. AN EXPLOSION OF NULLITY GROUNDS: THE HIGH TIDE MARK OF 
CANON LAW 
By the 1970s a general tendency had developed in case law to give effect to Catholic 
values when appropriate. However, the express terms of Article 41.3 seemed to 
preclude the development of nullity grounds that would make it easier to end a 
marriage. The problem was that Catholic canon law had moved on and become 
more flexible since 1937. Should the judiciary give effect to these new developments 
that were contrary to the values that the original framers of Article 41 were trying to 
preserve? How was such a conflict to be resolved?  
The constitutional ban on divorce did little to prevent marital instability actually 
occurring. In the 1970s marital breakdown continued to persist. The applications for 
Church annulments increased and a demand for „postal divorces‟ from England44 
                                                 
43  The interpretation of the nullity grounds of the 1917 Code of Canon Law had become more 
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applicants.  
developed in the 1970s and 1980s.45 In contrast to England and Wales,46 no statutory 
reforms on nullity were adopted in Ireland and the area remained a predominately 
common law doctrine.   
 In the 1970s, the judiciary continued to borrow principles from canon law.47 Unlike 
the judiciary of the 1940s and 1950s these principles were borrowed, not to ensure 
the survival of orthodox Catholic values, but to respond to the increasing reality of 
marriage breakdown.  
The old objective test for duress laid down in Griffith v Griffith,48 and considered to 
be consistent with canon law in the 1940s, was rejected by several High Court 
judgments in the seventies and eighties in favour of a subjective approach to 
consent. Some of these decisions were routed in canon law.    
In S v S,49 a nullity petition based on impotence, Kenny J was influenced by the fact 
that the parties had already successfully obtained a decree of nullity from the 
Catholic marriage tribunal. He dealt with the case not on the basis of impotence but 
on intention and introduced the canon law doctrine of simulation50 into Irish secular 
law. He ruled that at the time of the marriage, the husband had decided not to 
engage in sexual intercourse. As this decision was not known to the wife, no true 
consent to the marriage had been given.  This decision was to have an impact on 
move away from set grounds for nullity towards a general subjective ground of 
proper consent. 
In MK (Otherwise McC) v McC51 O‟Hanlon J referred to the fact that a Roman Catholic 
Tribunal had granted a decree of nullity on the basis of duress which included 
merely moral pressure. He took this as evidence that the canon law embraced a 
broader view of duress which should now be used by the Irish secular courts.  
In the Supreme Court decision of N (orse K) v K52 the broad subjective approach to 
duress taken by O‟Hanlon J in MK v F McC was approved. However,  it was held 
that the fact that a decree of nullity could be awarded by a Roman Catholic Court on 
the facts was a factor to be taken into account but should not influence the court  per 
se. Seeking a decree of nullity soon after a purported marriage and some time before 
the petition for nullity in the civil courts could, in certain cases, be accepted as 
evidence corroborating the allegation of an absence of real consent.53 
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Finlay CJ limited the use of contemporary canon law principles, stating  „"the 
principles and rules which the ecclesiastical courts of Ireland have heretofore acted 
on and given relief" must, in my view, be taken to refer to the ecclesiastical courts in 
Ireland established and in operation prior to 1870 and cannot be taken to refer to the 
current decisions of ecclesiastical courts of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland.‟54 
In Finlay CJ‟s judgment canon law is replaced with Article 41.3.2°. He notes that 
because of the bar on divorce: 
Consent to the taking of such a step must, therefore, if the marriage is to be valid, 
be a fully free exercise of the independent will of the parties. 
 
Henchy J55 called for the end of a system where the court went back to the principles 
medieval canon law and worked forward. „ Such a jurisdiction, defined by reference 
to what is now an obscure and outdated system of canon law, can hardly be said to 
be suited to the needs of today.‟ 
 
This movement away from canon law and towards Article 41 is also seen in Griffin 
J‟s judgment.56  McCarthy J also noted that the level of consent required for marriage 
should be commensurate with the constitutional status accorded to marriage. 57 
 
This is an important step forward in judicial reasoning. The authority initially 
gleaned from canon law being part of the secular law of Ireland is now found in the 
wordings of Article 41 itself.  
Finlay CJ stated that in order to rebut the presumption of validity of consent it was 
not necessary to prove a defined legal concept such as duress. Instead, such concepts 
were subservient to the ultimate objective which was to ascertain whether the 
consent of the party was real or apparent.58 The standard of consent required to form 
a marriage was set at „free exercise of the independent will of the parties‟.59 The 
consequence of this development was that consent could be rebutted by evidence of 
any flaw that rendered the consent less than perfect. By not limiting the grounds for 
which consent could be invalidated, the courts paved the way for a purely subjective 
approach to the level of consent required for marriage.  
 
By the end of the 1980s, commentators recognised that the expansion of the civil law 
of nullity owed much to the canon law.60 O‟Connor suggested that there should be 
no objection to the courts taking note of the scientific advances that had shaped 
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canonical jurisprudence and suggested that as the civil law and the Church law came 
to resemble each other, conflicts between the two would become less frequent.61 In 
other words, both systems stemmed from medieval canon law. The Catholic courts 
had more case law and thus more  experience of fitting the rules to modern facts and 
this should be considered as persuasive authority. 
However, it would seem that by N v K  the use of canon law has be relegated in 
favour of the use of Article 41.3 itself. Because marriage was to be protected, a value 
based on Catholic teachings, it must be ensured that every marriage was properly 
formed. Instead of appealing to the minutiae of canon law rulings, the judiciary 
could now take a broad brush approach, justifying their liberal approach to nullity  
with the Catholic values embodied in Article 41.  
For example in O’R v B62 Kinlen J seemed to suggest that the presumption of consent 
was very easy to rebut: „The institution of marriage is recognised and supported by 
common law and by the Constitution. In taking and conferring of a status the Courts 
must examine as to whether on both sides there was a full, free exercise of the 
respective independent will of the parties.‟   
The problem with the subjective test developed in N v K was that it did not seem to 
matter what sort of pressure caused the flaw in consent. It was only a matter of time 
before the courts dispensed with the need for duress altogether and focused merely 
on the consent itself.  In M O’M (orse O’C) v B O’C63 the Supreme Court unanimously 
decided that even in the absence of any form of duress, consent could be invalid 
where it was inadequately informed. The test laid down was whether „this spouse, 
marrying this particular man, could be said to have had adequate knowledge of 
every circumstance relevant to the decision she was making, so that her consent 
could truly be said to be an informed one‟.64   
According to M O’M v B O’C,  in order to establish that consent is invalid it must be 
shown that the petitioner was ignorant of some material fact. The assessment of 
whether or not a fact is material was up to the retroactive judgment of the 
petitioner.65 In M O’M v B O’C 66 itself, Blayney J granted a decree of nullity on the 
grounds that the wife had not given informed consent where the husband had not 
disclosed that he had previously seen a psychiatrist. No intention to deceive was 
required. It became difficult to fix a limit on defective knowledge when the court 
began to accept the subjective, personal and retroactive opinion of the petitioner.67 
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So although leading constitutional lawyers had argued that the original 41.3 barred 
widely-framed nullity legislation or „back-door divorce‟ as well as divorce,68 It 
would seem that the constitutional bar on divorce liberated rather than curtailed 
judicial imagination in according nullity decrees.  
The respect accorded to the marital institution in the Constitution stemming from 
the Catholic value of marriage as a permanent institution meant that it could not be 
entered lightly, as to do so would fragilise marriage. This development reflects a 
changing value of marriage. No longer was the semblance of stability enough for the 
court. To merit protection, the marriage had to have a chance of being successful.  
It is argued that the judiciary went further than modernising the law by reflecting 
current Catholic values and in fact hijacked the rhetoric of canon law to create a 
nullity doctrine that was effectively nullity on demand. This development was 
undoubtedly inspired by a pragmatic need to respond to marital breakdown in a 
country with no divorce. 
In N v K  Finlay J put this judicial pragmatism on more solid ground by confining 
canon law to its place as a medieval foundation for the system and using Article 41.3 
on which to base a liberal nullity regime. The use of canon law as a intermediary 
step had softened the impact of  circular reasoning whereby in the 1940s Article 41.3 
was interpreted as preventing a liberal nullity doctrine while in 1985 it was 
interpreted as mandating one.  
MOM v BOC signalled the high tide mark for subjective nullity. After the 
introduction of divorce in 1995, judicial activism in this area retreated.  
7. A NEW SECULAR AGE OF DIVORCE 
The first serious attempt to change the constitutional ban on divorce occurred in 
1986. The tenth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 1986 would have provided for 
divorce where the marriage had broken down and the failure had existed for five 
years. The proposal to amend the Constitution was rejected at the polls by 63.50% to 
36.50%.69 Instead a new regime for judicial separation was introduced.  
In 1989, the Judicial Separation and Family Reform Act made it possible to get a 
judicial separation where the spouses had lived apart for 3 years or where the 
marriage had broken down for at least a year, as well as on fault grounds. A decree 
of judicial separation abolished the duty to cohabit which had up until this point 
been part of the legal obligations of marriage.70 This radical change was challenged 
in  TF v Ireland. 71 The plaintiff contended that, in order to fulfil the State‟s obligation 
in Article 41, the State must oblige parties to make an attempt to save their marriage 
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and that s2 ss1 (1) of the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act 1989 set too 
low a threshold for the protection of the institution of marriage against attack.  
In the High Court, Murphy J held that the abolition of the restitution of conjugal 
rights was a clear and proper recognition that the institution of marriage could not 
be invoked in modern times to compel one party to live with another. 72  
In the Supreme Court, Hamilton CJ held that the protection accorded to marriage „is 
given in recognition of the contribution made by the institution of marriage to the 
welfare of the nation and the State, and the pledge must be seen in this light. It is not 
concerned solely with marriage itself, or with the spouses in a marriage, but was also 
in the common good.‟73 In many cases, it was in the common good that spouses 
should be separated, and this action merely recognised the breakdown in the 
marriage and did not constitute an attack on the institution of marriage or a failure 
to treat it with special care.  
In TF the constitutional duty to protect marriage became a duty not to reduce the 
appeal of marriage. If people could be forced to live together against their will after 
marrying, they would be unwilling to enter the institution. This reflects a change in 
social morality. In 1937, the idea of living apart when married would have been 
socially unacceptable. By 1989 it was more tolerated. In taking the purposive 
approach, Hamilton CJ‟s understanding of the protection of marriage was that the 
State must protect the aspects of marriage that contribute to the good of the society. 
This is a changeable standard that moves away from traditional Catholic values. By 
the standards of Irish modern society, forcible cohabitation served no good purpose 
and thus could not be retained solely on the basis that State must protect marriage 
against attack. 
However, Hamilton CJ was careful not to severe the Catholic heritage of Article 41 
completely.  He recognised that civil marriage was not limited by its traditional roots 
although it was derived from Christian notions of partnership. This was the first 
clear judicial recognition of marriage as a secular concept, albeit with religious roots. 
The second effort to introduce divorce followed shortly after TF. The fifteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution Bill 1995 was supported at the polls by 50.28% to 
49.72%.  
Article 41.3 now reads: 
 
1° The State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of 
Marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to protect it against attack.  
 
2°A court designated by law may grant a dissolution of marriage where, 
but only where, it is satisfied that: 
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i. at the date of the institution of the proceedings, the spouse have 
lived apart from one another for a period of, or periods 
amounting to at least four years during the previous five, 
ii. there is no reasonable prospect of a reconciliation between the 
spouses, 
iii. such provision as the court considers proper having regard to the 
circumstances exists or will be made for the spouses, any children 
or either or both of them and any other person prescribed by law, 
and  
iv. any further conditions prescribed by law are complied with. 
 
The Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 gave civil marriage a new existence separate 
from its original inception as an alternative to religious marriage.  Divorce ended all 
marriages in the eyes of the State. The response of the individual churches was a 
matter for individual faith. At the same time, section 32 of the Family Law Act 1995 
brought in standard preliminaries applicable to all marriages carried out in the State. 
Finally, in the 1990s, Irish law had conclusively moved to the idea of marriage as a 
legal concept applicable to all couples regardless of religion. 
However, the importance of marriage as a value in Irish society was still so high that 
divorce could not be left to the regulation of mere statute. While Ireland has adopted 
a modern no-fault divorce regime, it is quite strict compared with many other 
European systems. Moreover, those conditions are written directly into the 
Constitution and cannot easily be changed. It is argued that the necessity to do this 
reflects the reality that Irish morality was changing. While a bare majority were in 
favour of divorce, some were more enthusiastic that others. In 1937 it was enough to 
promise to protect marriage against attack, in 1995 the conservative population 
needed the reassurance at constitutional level of when divorce would and would not 
be permitted. 
 One of the peculiarities of divorce law in Ireland is the total absence of fault 
grounds. This is partly due to the lateness of the introduction of divorce which 
meant that Victorian ideas of matrimonial offence were unpopular.74 It is more 
directly attributable to the decision by the Government that the grounds for divorce 
should be simple and judgmentally neutral.75 However, the period of living apart is 
constitutionally set at a minimum of four years. 
Divorce in Ireland cannot be obtained unless financial provision for a dependent 
spouse and children has been settled and deemed „proper‟ by a court of law. Section 
20 of the Divorce Act 1996 allows the court to have great discretion in deciding what 
constitutes „proper provision‟ in any particular case. In addition Section 22 allows 
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the court to review the orders made at any later stage, if it considers it proper to do 
so having regard to any change in circumstances or any new evidence.  
Irish statute does not provide for „clean-break‟ divorce and so divorce does not 
completely sever the financial duties of the parties in regard to each other. The 
courts have no power to order that no further application for a lump sum or a 
property adjustment order can be made in the original divorce proceeding. It is 
therefore possible for to apply for an adjustment order up until the death of your 
spouse76 although there is no guarantee that such an adjustment will be granted.  
The Supreme Court has indicated that finality in financial adjustment is desirable 
after marital breakdown77 however, they are not ready to admit that marriage is no 
longer a lifelong commitment.  In DT v CT, Murray J reiterated that marriage is 
entered into in principle for life. Furthermore Murray J interpreted the „proper 
provision‟ principle, as being linked to the nature of marriage as a lifelong 
commitment:  
 
Even where a marriage is dissolved by judicial decree, the laws of many if 
not most states require that the divorced spouses continue to respect and 
fulfil certain obligations deriving from their dissolved marriage for their 
mutual protection and welfare, usually of a financial nature. This reflects 
the fact that marriage is in principle intended to be a lifetime commitment 
and that each spouse has fashioned his or her life on that premise. If the 
law permitted a spouse to cut himself or herself adrift of a marriage on 
divorce without any continuing obligation to the former spouse, it would 
undermine the very nature of the marriage contract itself and fail to 
protect the value which society has placed on it as an institution. …. 
Hence the constitutional imperative of proper provision for spouses.78 
 
The 2006 Constitutional Review took a more pragmatic view and concluded that the 
introduction of divorce had changed the nature of marriage and that the family in 
the Constitution had in turn been redefined as being based on a potentially 
temporary arrangement.79 
 
The introduction of divorce in the 1996 brought an end to what Duncan described as 
„a policy which tries to counter the stresses which modern life imposes on the 
marriage relationship by strapping it into an institutional strait-jacket.‟80 However, 
as can be seen by the decisions in TF and N(K) v K,  the judiciary had already moved 
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away from a policy of protecting all marriages to one where the potential 
functionality of the protected marriage was paramount. The courts ensured the 
stability of marriage, by making it easier for unstable couples to resolve their 
differences or to walk away from a failed relation to form a new and, hopefully, 
more stable unit.  
The approach had been to favour the common good that the marital unit has 
brought to society rather than to fossilise the letter of the 1937 protection of marriage 
as an irrevocable commitment based on Catholic teachings. It is argued that, in this 
way, the protection of marriage has developed to give greater respect to the private 
sphere of family relationships.  
 
8. THE END OF SUBJECTIVE NULLITY 
The introduction of no fault divorce meant that there was no longer any pragmatic 
need for a liberal nullity regime. However, the absence of financial certainty when a 
divorce was granted led to one final hurrah for the subjective doctrine of nullity. In 
Irish law, if a decree of nullity was granted, the marriage was deemed never to have 
existed and the court had no powers for financial distribution.   
Unsurprisingly the courts were unreceptive to this attempt to evade the „proper 
provision‟ requirement for divorce. M O’M v B O’C signalled the high tide mark of 
subjectivism in Irish nullity law and from 1999 onwards the courts swung back to 
the 1940s standpoint that the Irish constitutional protection of marriage meant that 
nullity should be very difficult to prove and rarely granted.  
In O’B v R81  Kinlen J reverted to the approach to Article 41 seen in Griffith v Griffith.  
He held that the constitutional protection of marriage meant that „There is 
undoubtedly a heavy burden of proof on a petitioner to establish that a marriage is 
null and void. It is for the trial judge to determine whether the parties' marriage is a 
nullity. As marriage is protected by the Constitution, it is important that the courts 
must exercise particular caution and scepticism in scrutinising the evidence 
proffered‟.82 
Limitations were placed on the doctrine of defective knowledge in PF v G O’M.83  In 
the Supreme Court, McGuinness J stated that M O’M v B O’C had left the 
requirement for informed consent so wide as to cover almost any situation where a 
petitioner gave evidence that her or she would not have married the respondent had 
the information been available before the marriage.84 She held that this was 
incompatible with the Irish constitutional protection of marriage: 
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 The introduction of a ground for nullity which, taken to its logical 
conclusion, could bring uncertainty into a wide variety of marriages is not 
only undesirable as a matter of public policy but is contrary to the clear 
intention of Article 41.3.1.85 
 
The Supreme Court limited the ruling in  MO’M v BO’C  to its facts. 
 
The 2009  Supreme Court case of  LB v T MacC86 ends all further possibilities for a 
subjective approach to nullity. This case involved a financially successful woman 
who had married a man who had held himself out to be successful. On the contrary, 
he was a financial drain on his wife, debtridden and did not contribute financially to 
the relationship. In the High Court O'Higgins J. concluded that the respondent's lack 
of full disclosure about his financial affairs, family and social circumstances, were 
not grounds upon which one could base a claim for nullity. 
In the supreme Court Kearns J clearly approved a return to the original 
understanding of the effect of Article 41 on nullity jurisprudence: 
 The Constitution imposes a clear obligation on the courts to uphold the 
marriage contract and it would require far stronger evidence than has 
been adduced in this case to satisfy me that the respondent lacked the 
requisite capacity to enter a valid contract of marriage.87 
 
The Supreme Court have called for legislative action in the area of nullity in both  PF 
v GOM  and LB v T MacC.  It is clear that after the introduction of no fault divorce, 
the door has shut on subjective nullity. 
9.  CONCLUSIONS 
The approach of the Irish courts to the doctrine of nullity has come full circle. The 
interaction between canon law and Catholic values, and the secular doctrine of 
nullity was instrumental in the development of a flexible nullity doctrine that filled 
the gap before the introduction of divorce in 1995.   
The relationship between canon law and secular law in Ireland has always been 
uneasy and the extent that one influences the other has depended largely on the 
politics and social morality of the time. Before 1937, Catholics remained largely 
outside the secular system. When cases did make it to the Irish secular courts, the 
mainly Protestant judiciary were eager not to rule in a way that was contrary to the 
morals of Catholic couples and the prevailing ideology at the time. 
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The myth created in McK v McK,  that canon law is at the root of Irish secular nullity 
law proved an excellent tool for the judiciary to use to make their judgments 
publically acceptable. The development of a liberal nullity law through the rhethoric 
of canon law was merely an extension of this policy.  
Until 1970, the prevailing Irish morality was strictly against the breakdown of 
marriage and the possibility of divorce by nullity. The framing of Article 41 shows 
that the framers originally intended for the article to hold people to their marriage 
vows and reflect 1940s Catholic values. Clearly, by design, Article 41 was supposed 
to prevent the creation of a liberal approach to nullity. For a time the secular law was 
interpreted as being as close as possible to Catholic teachings and this reflected a 
clear national identity and homogeneous interpretation of Catholic teachings.  
 However, the problem quickly appeared that the medieval canon law values on 
which secular nullity law was supposedly based, were not the same as 
contemporary Catholic values. Thus in  the cases of  Griffith, Tilson  and Ballins  there 
is a clear attempt by the judiciary to develop the law in line with contemporary 
Catholic values and where they could not, this was something that the legislature 
was implored to remedy.  Until 1970, strict Catholic values as represented by the 
constitutional protection of marriage were used to justify a conservative law and this 
was acceptable to a largely conservative Catholic population.  
After 1970 these strict Catholic values are used to create a stepping stop to the 
development of a flexible nullity doctrine that takes the place of much needed 
divorce.  The rhetoric of canon law is used in cases such as S v S and MK (Otherwise 
McC) v McC  to legitimise what the judiciary were doing but lots of other cases from 
the time cite no authority whatsoever for the creation of a subjective approach to 
nullity.88 The unpinning goal of the judiciary must be interpreted as responding to a 
changing social morality. The judiciary took a „catholic‟ approach to canon law 
taking the bits that are useful to respond to the growing societal need for divorce.  
Canon law provided a legitimacy which was replaced in N v K by a resort to the 
wording of Article 41.3 itself. The logic of N v K leaves the doctrines of canon law 
behind merely taking from Catholic values the idea that marriage is sacred, an idea 
embodied in Article 41. This protection meant that that marriage is such a serious 
commitment that it must be very difficult to make. This interpretation ignored the 
original intention of the framers and the contemporary canon law yet the basis for its 
legitimacy is Catholic values.  
After the introduction of divorce, this interpretation of Article 41 has served its 
purpose. The courts reverted to using Article 41 to limit the doctrine of nullity and 
the justifications found in Griffith  and  McK used to legitimise a conservative 
Catholic law resurface. The judiciary no longer use canon law to justify their 
„catholic‟ approach to nullity grounds. Marriage law become a more secular concept 
merely routed in Christianity.   
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Although the constitutional protection of marriage remains, in the absence of 
homogenous religious values is having an increasing inconsistent effect. The courts 
have established that the institutional protection of marriage is subject to the 
common good.89 It has also been established that other constitutional rights will take 
priority over the constitutional protection of marriage such as those under Article 
40.3.90 The intervention of EU law also means that the Article 41 protection must be 
interpreted subject to the rights given under EU treaties. 
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